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Abstract
Employing a two-period OLG model with labor market frictions and
PAYG pension, this paper examines the eects of population aging on the
unemployment rate and the per capita output of the economy. We show that
in economies in which the population growth rate is already low and the
size of PAYG pension is relatively large, a further decline in the population
growth rate reduces the unemployment rate and increases the per capita out-
put of the economy in the short run, but it increases the unemployment rate
and reduces the per capita output of the economy in the long run.
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1 Introduction
Most advanced countries facing rapidly aging populations are expected to con-
front a decline in their labor force in the next few decades. Several countries such
as Japan and Germany are already experiencing a fall in their labor force.1 Due
to a low and/or declining fertility rate in past decades, the inflow of young peo-
ple into the labor force will be smaller than the outflow of older workers who
retire, resulting in a natural decline of the population of working age. If activity
rates remain constant, this will result in a decrease of the labor force. Several re-
search reports provided by some think tanks and international organizations argue
that such a decline in the working-age population may cause a tight labor mar-
ket in which labor demand exceeds labor supply (e.g., Richard and Amico, 1997;
OECD, 2003, 2013; Ganelli and Miyake, 2015). In the medium term, the increas-
ing number of retirees will, in some occupations, lead to a replacement demand
that will be hard to fill from domestic labor supplies, which may result in a labor
force shortage or a reduced unemployment rate. However, because the projections
of long-term labor demand and supply are highly conjectural, there has been in-
tense debate on the plausibility of these labor shortage arguments (e.g., Freeman,
2006; Garlo and Wapler, 2016).
To the best of our knowledge, except for a few papers mentioned later, these
existing studies of population aging and labor markets are based on partial equi-
librium models and restrict their analyses to the direct eects of population aging
within the labor market. However, population aging, triggered by a rise in life ex-
pectancy and a decline in fertility rates, induces changes in individuals’ saving and
investment behaviors, which may provide non-negligible indirect influences on
the labor market through its general equilibrium eects. Therefore, in this paper,
we propose a tractable general equilibrium growth model to analyze the eects
of population aging on the labor market and the macro economy with emphasis
on the role of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems. Because wage incomes
are the primary sources of financing for public pension systems, interactions be-
tween labor market and pension systems are of particular relevance (e.g., Corneo
and Marquardt, 2000; Kemnitz, 2003; Bra¨uninger, 2005; Ono, 2010). This paper
develops a simple two-period overlapping generations (OLG) model with labor
market frictions and PAYG pension and examines how population aging caused
by a decline in the population growth rate influences the unemployment rate and
1According to government latest projections, Japan’s labor force is projected to shrink in the
next two decades. The labor force is expected to decline from 66.3 million in 2010 to 56.8 million
in 2030 under a “negative” scenario in which real growth remains near 0 percent and the labor
force participation rate drops from 59.6 percent in 2010 to 54.3 percent in 2030. Even in a “positive
scenario” with real average growth at 2 percent and the labor participation rate increasing to 60.1
percent by 2030, the labor force would still decrease to 62.9 million.
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the per capita output of the economy.
In the model presented here, we first consider the case where a PAYG pen-
sion system is financed by a defined-benefit scheme. Under this pension payout
scheme, we show that in economies in which the population growth rate is already
low and the size of PAYG pension is relatively large, a further decline in the pop-
ulation growth rate reduces the unemployment rate and increases the per capita
output of the economy in the short run, but it increases the unemployment rate
and reduces the per capita output of the economy in the long run. These results
are intuitively explained as follows. In our model, the unemployment rate and the
capital per operating firms are negatively related. In the short run, a decline in the
population growth rate mitigates the dilution of savings by the previous genera-
tion, increasing the level of capital per operating firms and thereby reducing the
unemployment rate and increasing the per capita output of the economy. However,
in the long run, a further decline in the population growth rate leads to a surge in
the social security tax rate, decreasing the level of capital per operating firms and
thereby increasing the unemployment rate and reducing the per capita output of
the economy.
Furthermore, in the model presented here, we consider the two dierent types
of pension payout schemes: a defined-contribution scheme and a tax adjusted
defined-benefit scheme. Then, we examine how the introduction of these two
types of pension payout schemes aects the short run as well as the long run
eects of population aging on the unemployment rate and the per capita output
of the economy. Under these two types of PAYG pension payout schemes, we
find that a decline in the population growth rate reduces the unemployment rate
and increases the per capita output of the economy not only in the short run, but
also in the long run. Therefore, we can confirm that the design of pension payout
scheme matters to mitigate the long run negative eects of population aging on
the employment rate and the per capita output of the economy.
This paper is related to several branches of the literature.2 First, this paper
relates to the literature on pensions and unemployment in the context of two-
period OLG growth models (e.g., Corneo and Marquardt, 2000; Kemnitz, 2003;
Bra¨uninger, 2005; Ono, 2010). However, most of these studies employ collective
wage-bargaining setting, and rather concern the growth and welfare implications
of pension and unemployment insurance policies. This paper diers from these
2This paper also shares the broad research question with the literature on the aging of labor
force (i.e., the rise in average age of people in the labor force). This literature examines how the
changes in the age structure of the labor force influence aggregate or age-specific unemployment
rates and wage rates. For example, using data on most OECD countries from 1970 and 1994,
Korenman and Neumark (2000) estimate that large youth cohorts lead to large increases in the
relative unemployment rates of youth, with elasticities as high as 0.5 or 0.6. See Dixson (2003)
for a literature review.
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studies in that we employ the model with labor market frictions as in Bean and
Pissarides (1993), which rather concerns the impacts of population aging on the
unemployment rate and the per capita output of the economy.
Second, this paper relates to the series of two-period OLG studies that discuss
the growth impacts of population aging, often paying attention to the adjustments
required in the PAYG pension system (e.g., Zhang et al. 2001, 2003, 2005; Fanti
and Gori, 2012; Artige et al, 2014; Tabata, 2015). Among these studies, those
by Artige et al. (2014) and Tabata (2015) are closely related to our contributions
because they emphasize the design of the PAYG pension payout scheme as a factor
to determine the eects of population aging on capital accumulation. Artige et
al. (2014) and Tabata (2015) show that the eect of population aging on capital
accumulation is always positive under a defined-contribution scheme, whereas
the eect is ambiguous under a defined-benefit scheme. Although our theoretical
results are partly indebted to their contributions, in contrast to them, we consider
the eects of population aging on the unemployment rate through its impact on
capital accumulation, which is not examined explicitly in these studies.
Third, this paper is related to numerical simulation studies that quantify the
impact of demographic changes on the macroeconomy (e.g., Bo¨rsch-Supan, 2001;
Attanasio et al. 2006, 2007; Krueger and Ludwig, 2007; de la croix et al., 2013).
These studies employ large-scale OLG models similar to those of Auerbach and
Kotolico (1987). Among them, this paper is closely related to de la croix et al.
(2013), which introduce labor market frictions into a standard OLG set up and
examine the eects of population aging and pension reform on the unemployment
rate and other macroeconomic variables. Using recent demographic projections in
France, they show that population aging reduces the unemployment rate through
its eect on capital accumulation, the interest rate and job openings. They also
show that introducing labor market frictions changes the quantitative eects of
pension reforms. These existing numerical simulation studies are quite appealing
and plausible. We share the same broad question with this literature; however,
because their purpose is to provide realistic quantitative projections of several
macroeconomic variables, these models possess relatively complicated structures
and mechanisms. To achieve this result, the values of several exogenous variables
are changed simultaneously in their simulations. Consequently, it is sometimes
dicult to understand which specifications or assumptions are responsible for de-
riving the simulation results. In this sense, these numerical models are not very
tractable. Therefore, to complement these existing numerical studies, we con-
struct a tractable two-period OLG model that enables us to examine analytically
how population aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate influ-
ences the unemployment rate and the per capita output of the economy through its
impact on capital accumulation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the basic model.
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Section 3 investigates the dynamic behavior in equilibrium and derives the re-
lationship between the unemployment rate and the capital accumulation under
a defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme. Section 4 focuses on the steady-state
equilibrium and examines the long run eects of population aging on the unem-
ployment rate and the per capita output of the economy. Section 5 focuses on the
transitional phase and examines numerically the short run eects of population
aging on the unemployment rate and the per capita output of the economy. Sec-
tion 6 examines how the alternative design of pension payout schemes aects the
main results of this paper. Section 7 compares the theoretical results obtained in
Sections 4 to 6. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 The model
We consider a two-period-lived overlapping generations model where the econ-
omy comprises many identical firms, ex ante identical individuals and a govern-
ment. We denote the generation born in period t as the generation t. Time is
discrete and denoted by t = 0; 1; 2;    . In each period t, Nt individuals are born
and live for two periods, youth and old age. The population grows at the constant
rate n: Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1, where n 2 ( 1;1). In each period t, there exist only two
generations: the active working young and the retired old. Only young individuals
are endowed with one unit of labor and have an opportunity to work by matching
with a firm, so Nt is also the size of the total labor force potentially supplied in
each period t. Unemployment in this model occurs only in youth.
The old-age dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio of old dependents to the young
working population) in period t is given by Nt 1Nt =
1
1+n . Thus, population aging
is triggered if there is a decrease in the population growth rate n. Further, the
shrinking workforce (i.e., Nt < Nt 1) occurs when the population growth rate n is
suciently low to satisfy n < 0.
2.1 Technology and firms
Many identical firms produce final goods with the same production technology. In
addition to capital, one worker is necessary for a firm to produce the final goods.
More concretely, workers and firms with vacant positions search for each other
in the labor market. Firms that successfully match with a worker can operate
their business. Firm i produces final goods yi;t at period t with a Cobb-Douglas
production technology: yi;t = Aki;tx
1 
i;t ,where  2 (0; 1) is a capital share of output,
ki;t is capital per firm i, which depreciates in one period, xi;t is labor employed by
firm i, and A is productivity of the technology. Because an operating firm hires
only one worker, eventually it holds that xi;t = 1, and the production function is
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expressed as follows:
yi;t = Aki;t: (1)
Because the capital market is competitive, capital is paid its marginal product:
rt = Ak 1i;t = Ak
 1
t ; (2)
where rt is the rental price of capital. The firm-specific index i is dropped because
each firm employs the same amount of capital, facing the common rental price of
capital. Then, the remainder of output to be allotted between firm i and its worker
is given by
t = (1   )Akt : (3)
2.2 Individuals
Each individual derives utility from his or her own consumption in both youth and
old age. Thus, the lifetime utility of an individual born in period t (i.e., generation
t) is expressed as
U jt = (c
j
1;t)
(c j2;t+1)
1 ; (4)
where c j1;t is consumption in youth, c
j
2;t+1 is consumption in old age and  2 (0; 1)
is the utility weight given to the consumption in youth relative to the consumption
in old age. The superscript j denotes the status of labor in youth: j = e and j = u
if an individual is employed and unemployed, respectively. The status is assigned
according to the matching process between the firm and the worker (described
later) at the beginning of each period. The specification of utility function makes
the analysis of the bargaining process between the firm and the worker (described
later) tractable.
An individual chooses consumption and savings to maximize his or her life-
time utility under the following budget constraints:
c j1;t + s
j
t = !
j
t =
8>><>>:(1   t   t)wt, if j = e¯t, if j = u; (5)
c j2;t+1 = rt+1s
j
t + b¯t+1; (6)
where! jt is type- j individual’s net income in youth, wt is wage, ¯t is unemployment-
insurance benefits, s jt is savings, rt+1 is gross interest rate,3 t is the tax on labor
income to cover unemployment insurance benefits, t is the tax on labor income
3Because the depreciation rate of capital is assumed to be 1, the gross interest rate equals to
the rental price of capital.
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to cover pension benefits, and b¯t+1 is pension benefits for both employed and un-
employed. Unemployment benefits are assumed to be exempt from taxation. To
preserve tractability, as in Bra¨uninger (2005) and Ono (2010), we consider the
case where the unemployed receives pension benefits without any contributions.
Of course, the above payment scheme is rather extreme and cannot capture the
complex structures of recent social security systems in their entirety. Neverthe-
less, this simple framework improves the tractability of the model greatly without
changing the qualitative implications of this paper.4
By solving the utility-maximization problem, we obtain the saving function of
a type- j individual as follows:
s jt = (1   )! jt   
b¯t+1
rt+1
: (7)
The above function states that a higher wage level or unemployment-insurance
benefits implies higher savings, whereas a higher tax rate or pension benefit im-
plies lower savings. The corresponding consumption functions are c j1;t = (!
j
t +
b¯t+1
rt+1
) and c j2;t+1 = (1   )rt+1(! jt + b¯t+1rt+1 ). Thus, using these functions, the indirect
utility function of a type- j individual is given by:
U jt = 
[(1   )rt+1]1 (! jt +
b¯t+1
rt+1
): (8)
2.3 Unemployment insurance
Unemployment insurance provides an intragenerational transfer from the employed
to the unemployed. This transfer system is balanced in each period, thereby yield-
ing the following equality:
(Nt   Lt)¯t = twtLt; (9)
where Lt is the number of employed and Nt Lt is the number of unemployed. The
left hand side is the total expenditure for unemployed benefits, and the right hand
side is the total revenue raised from the employed. The unemployed benefits are
paid to unemployed workers according to the following defined-benefit payment
rule:
¯t = (1   t   t)wt; (10)
where  2 (0; 1). The unemployment benefit payment to each unemployed worker
in period t is proportional to but less than the after tax labor income of employed
worker in period t.
4Even if we consider the case where government imposes lump sum taxes for both employed
and unemployed to cover the both pension and unemployment benefits, the qualitative implications
of this paper do not change at all.
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From (9) and (10), the unemployment insurance tax rate is given by t =
(1 lt)
lt+(1 lt) (1   t), where lt  LtNt 2 [0; 1]. The higher unemployment benefit ,
the lower employment rate lt and the lower pension tax rate t lead to the higher
unemployment insurance tax rate.
2.4 Pensions
Pensions are financed by a pay-as-you-go system. The pension system provides
an intergenerational transfer from the young to the old. All pension benefits in
period t are financed by the total amount of contributions paid by the employed in
that period. The revenue constraint is given by:
b¯tNt 1 = twtLt; (11)
where the left hand side is the total expenditure composed of the payments to all
the old individuals and the right hand side is the total revenue raised from the
employed. The pension benefits are paid to all old individuals according to the
following defined-benefit payment rule:
b¯t = bwtlt; (12)
where b 2 [0; 1) and lt  LtNt 2 [0; 1]. The pension payment to each old individual
in period t is proportional to but less than the average before tax labor income
of the young generation in period t.5 We denote this pension payment rule as a
defined-benefit scheme. In a defined-benefit scheme, the pension benefit for each
old individual is adjusted according to changes in the young generations’ wages
wt or their employment environments lt (i.e., wage indexation). However, it is not
adjusted in response to changes in demographic conditions or young generations’
social security burden (i.e., non-demographically modified wage indexation). This
specification of pension payment rule is crucial to derive our main theoretical
results. Section 6 briefly examines the cases of other pension payout schemes
in which pension benefit is fully adjusted in response to changes in demographic
conditions or young generations’ social security burden.
From (11) and (12), the pension tax rate is given by t = (n)  b1+n . The
higher pension benefit b and the lower population growth rate n lead to the higher
pension tax rate. To emphasize this negative relationship between population
growth rate and pension tax rate, we describe  as (n). Because  2 (0; 1), the
following parameter conditions must hold.
n 2 ( (1   b);1):
5The average before tax labor income of the young generation in period t is given by wtLtNt = wtlt.
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2.5 Labor market
We introduce labor-market matching frictions in the model along the same line
as Bean and Pissarides (1993) and Hashimoto, Im, and Kunieda (2016). Al-
though the matching mechanism follows from the standard unemployment model
(e.g., Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Petrongolo and Pissarides;
2001), there is no time lag between a match of parties and a start of business op-
eration in the current model.
2.5.1 Matching mechanism
Because workers and firms face matching frictions, unemployment occurs in equi-
librium although each young individual is endowed with one unit of labor that is
supplied inelastically if he or she is employed. The number of successful matches
are given by F(Nt; t), which is a function of the population of workers Nt, and
the number of firms with vacancy t, where 0  F(Nt; t)  minfNt; tg for
Nt 2 [0;1) and t 2 [0;1), F(0; t) = 0, F(Nt; 0) = 0, limNt!1 F(Nt; t) = t
and limt!1 F(Nt; t) = Nt. The matching function F(Nt; t) is continuously dif-
ferentiable, concave, homogeneous of degree one, and increasing with respect to
both Nt and t. The tightness of the labor market is expressed by t  tNt 2 (0;1),
which is considered the jobs-to-applicants ratio, and the probability that a firm
with a vacancy matches with a worker is given by F(Nt; t)=t = F(1=t; 1)  q(t)
where q0(t) < 0, limt!0 q(t) = 1 and limt!1 q(t) = 0. Because the num-
ber of employment is equal to the number of successful matches, it follows that
Lt = ltNt = F(Nt; t), which is rewritten as
lt =
F(Nt; t)
Nt
= F(1; t) = tq(t)  l(t): (13)
Equation (13) yields the employment rate lt as a function of t. Because
@F(1;t)
@t
>
0, we can easily confirm that the relations l0(t) > 0, limt!0 l(t) = 0 and limt!1 l(t) =
1 hold. Because unemployment rate ut is given by ut  Nt LtNt = 1 lt, (13) is rewrit-
ten as
ut = 1   l(t)  u(t); (14)
where u0(t) < 0, limt!0 u(t) = 1 and limt!1 u(t) = 0. Therefore, as shown
in the upper panel of Figure 1, (13) and (14) derive a positive (resp., negative)
relationship between the employment rate (resp. the unemployment rate) and the
labor-market tightness, which is the so-called Beveridge curve.
A successful match enables a firm to produce the final goods. Because q(t) is
the probability that a firm matches with a worker in period t, the firm’s expected
profits Vt are given by
Vt = q(t)(t   wt)   h; (15)
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where h is the search cost in the labor market that the firm incurs when searching
for a worker. Because the upper limit of q(t) is one, if t wt < h, no firms operate
because the expected profits are negative. In other words, only if t   wt  h,
successful matches occur between workers and firms. In the following analysis,
we proceed our analysis for the case in which the relation t   wt  h holds.
The parameter conditions that ensure t   wt  h are discussed later. Under these
assumptions, the free-entry condition for the final goods sector leads to zero profits
of each firm. Accordingly, it follows that Vt = 0, or equivalently
t   wt = hq(t) : (16)
2.5.2 Nash bargaining
The remainder of the output after payments to capital is allotted between the firm
and its worker. The shares to each are determined by maximizing the following
Nash product with respect to the wage:
wt = arg max
wt
(Uet  Uut )(t wt)1  = f[(1 )rt+1](1 )g[(1 t t)wt ¯t](t wt)1 ;
(17)
where  2 (0; 1) is the worker’s bargaining power. From the Nash bargaining
solution, it follows that
wt = t +
1   
(1   t   t) ¯t: (18)
Note that when the firm and its worker are bargaining, they do not have any in-
formation about the government’s unemployment policy concretely, and thus, the
Nash product is maximized with ¯t given. Because the government pays the unem-
ployment benefits to unemployed workers in such a way that ¯t = (1  t   t)wt,
inserting (3) and (10) in (18) yields
wt = 
t = 
(1   )Akt ; (19)
where 
  1 (1 ) 2 (0; 1) is the worker’s output share of t. Note from 
 =

1 (1 ) that the larger outside option  and the larger Nash bargaining power 
lead to the greater worker’s share. Substituting (3) and (19) into (16) yields
(1  
)(1   )Akt =
h
q(t)
: (20)
It is noted from (20), that given parameter values, if kt is suciently small to
satisfy (1 
)(1 )Akt < h, firms cannot cover a search cost h, because the upper
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limit of q(t) is 1. Therefore, in the following analysis, we focus our analysis on
the case in which the following inequality holds:
kt > k¯; 8 t > 0; (21)
where k¯  [ h(1 
)(1 )A ]
1
 .
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by the optimization conditions of individuals and
firms, the outcomes of the Nash bargaining in the labor market, and the market
clearing conditions for capital.
3.1 Beveridge curve and capital accumulation
Equation (20) can be rewritten as follows:
t = q 1(
h
(1  
)(1   )Akt
)  (kt): (22)
Because of the properties of q(t) function explained in Section 2-5, as shown
in the lower panel of Figure 1, it is straightforward to show that the relations
0(kt) > 0, for kt 2 (k¯;1), limkt!k¯ (kt) = 0 and limkt!1 (kt) = 1 hold. Capital
accumulation increases the demand for labor, which positively aects the tight-
ness of the labor market. Following Pissarides (2000), we denote equation (22) as
the job-creation condition.
Substituting the job-creation condition of (22) into the Beveridge curve of
(13), we obtain
lt = l((kt))  l(kt): (23)
Because of the properties of l(t) function explained in (13), we can easily confirm
that the relations l0(kt) > 0, for kt 2 (k¯;1), limkt!k¯ l(kt) = 0 and limkt!1 l(kt) = 1
hold. As shown in Figure 1, capital accumulation promotes employment, render-
ing the labor market tighter.
3.2 Dynamics
The market-clearing condition for capital is given by
Kt+1 = set Lt + s
u
t (Nt   Lt): (24)
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By substituting (5), (7) and (9) into (24), we obtain
Kt+1 = (1   )(1   t)wtLt    b¯t+1rt+1 Nt: (25)
Using (n) = b1+n , the per capita pension benefit b¯t in (12) is rewritten as b¯t =
(1+ n)(n)wtlt. By substituting (2), (3), (19), b¯t+1 = (1+ n)(n)wt+1lt+1 and Nt+1 =
(1 + n)Nt into (25), the dynamics of aggregate capital Kt is given by
Kt+1 =
(1   )[1   (n)]
1 + (n)
 1 


(1   )AKt L1 t ; (26)
where Kt  ktLt.
We then consider the dynamics of aggregate employment Lt. Because of
the labor-market matching frictions, the aggregate employment Lt is given by
Lt = ltNt. Thus, using (23) and Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt, the dynamics of the aggre-
gate employment Lt is described by
Lt+1 =
l(kt+1)
l(kt)
(1 + n)Lt: (27)
Using (26) and (27), we can derive an autonomous dierence equation with re-
spect to kt as follows:
l(kt+1)kt+1 =  (n; (n))l(kt)kt ; (28)
where
 (n; (n))  (1   )[1   (n)]
(1   )A
(1 + n)[1 + (n)
1 

]
=
(1 + n   b)(1   )
(1   )A
(1 + n + b
 1 

)(1 + n)
:
Because we focus on the case in which kt > k¯ for all t  0 as discussed in the
previous section, the domain of the dynamical system in (28) is given by kt 2
(k¯;1). Given the initial aggregate capital K0 and population size N0, the initial
capital per operating firm k0 is determined uniquely by (23) and k0l0N0 = K0,
which means that capital per operating firm is pre-determined in period 0.
3.3 Steady states and stability
From (28), we can easily confirm that the following proposition hold.
Proposition 1 In the dynamic system of equation (28), there exists a unique (non-
trivial) steady-state k such that
k = [ (n; (n))]1=(1 )  k(n): (29)
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To emphasize the relationship between the steady-state capital per operating firm
and the population growth rate, we describe k as k(n). Because l(kt+1)kt+1  
l(kt)kt = l(kt)[ (n; (n))kt   kt], the inequality l(kt+1)kt+1  (<)l(kt)kt holds, if
kt  (>)k. Further, noting 1 =  (n; (n))k 1 and  2 (0; 1), the dierentiation
of (28) with respect to kt around the steady-state k yields
dkt+1
dkt

kt+1=kt=k
=
l0(k)k + l(k)
l0(k)k + l(k)
< 1: (30)
The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 2 In the dynamical system of equation (28), the steady-state k is
stable.
Figure 2 illustrates the possible dynamic behavior of the economy. Given the
initial aggregate capital K0 and population size N0, the initial capital per operating
firm k0 is determined uniquely, and thus, the economy eventually converges to the
unique steady-state equilibrium E with k. The parameter conditions that ensures
k > k¯ is given by
A >
h1 
(1  
)1 (1   ) [
(1 + n)(1 + 
1 

)
(1   )(1   )
 ]
: (31)
4 Long run eects of population aging
In this section, we focus on the steady-state equilibrium and examine the long run
eects of population aging on the unemployment rate and the per capita output of
the economy under a defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme. To understand this
issue, we need to understand the relationship between the population growth rate
and the steady-state capital per operating firm.
4.1 Steady-state capital per operating firm
In this subsection, we examine how population aging caused by a decline in the
population growth rate influences the steady-state capital per operating firm un-
der a defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme. From (29), regarding the eect of
the population growth rate n on the steady-state capital per operating firm k, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under PAYG pension system with a defined-benefit scheme, the
following statements hold:
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(1) Suppose b 2 (0; 1), then there exists an unique nˆ 2 ( (1   b);1) such that
k(nˆ)  k(n), 8n 2 ( (1   b);1), @k(n)
@n > 0 8n 2 ( (1   b); nˆ), @k
(n)
@n < 08n 2 (nˆ;1), where
nˆ   (1   b) + b
r
1 + 

1   

:
(2) Suppose b = 0, then @k
(n)
@n < 0 holds.
Proof of Proposition 3 is given in Appendix. Proposition 3 indicates that when a
PAYG pension system is financed by a defined-benefit scheme (i.e., b 2 (0; 1)),
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the population growth rate and
the steady-state capital per operating firm. However, when there is no PAYG
pension system (i.e., b = 0), the relationship between the population growth rate
and the steady-state capital per operating firm is always negative.
Figure 3-1 shows numerical examples of the relationship between the popula-
tion growth rate and the steady-state capital per operating firm under alternative
values b of pension payout (i.e., b = 0, 0:2, 0:4 and 0:6). In the simulation, the
matching function is specialized as F(Nt; t) = (Ntt)=(Nt +

t )
1=, following Den
Haan et al. (2000). Under this matching function, from (22) and (23), the employ-
ment rate lt is given by lt = f1   [h=(1  
)(1   )Akt ]g1=. The parameters used
in the baseline simulations are given in footnote 6, and its explanation is provided
in the Appendix.6 Note that the objective of these numerical examples is not to
calibrate our simple model to actual data but to supplement the qualitative results.
The quantitative results obtained in this paper should be interpreted with caution.
Consistent with Proposition 3, when b 2 (0; 1), there is an inverted U-shaped
relationship between the population growth rate and the steady-state capital per
operating firm. However, when b = 0, the relationship between the population
growth rate and the steady-state capital per operating firm is always negative.
The mechanism of this inverted U-shaped relationship between n and k under
a defined-benefit scheme is explained as follows. Equation (28) implies that a
decline in the population growth rate n exerts two competing influences on capital
accumulation. Under a defined-benefit scheme, a decline in the population growth
rate n increases the old-age dependency ratio 11+n , which positively aects the
pension tax rate . This higher pension tax rate leads to a lower rate of saving by
young individuals, which negatively aects capital accumulation. We denote this
negative eect of a decline in n on capital accumulation as the “tax burden eect”.
This tax burden eect does not exist when there is no PAYG pension system (i.e.,
b = 0). Conversely, a decline in the population growth rate nmitigates the dilution
6 = 0:5,  = 0:6,  = 0:5,n = 0 b = 0:4, h = 1 and A = 8:907
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of savings and thus positively aects capital accumulation. We denote this positive
eect of a decline in n on capital accumulation as the “anti-dilution eect”. This
anti-dilution eect always exists irrespective of the existence of PAYG pension
system. Therefore, a decline in the population growth rate always increases the
steady-state capital per operating firm when there is no pension system (i.e., b =
0).
These results suggest that in economies in which the population growth rate
is already low and the size of PAYG pension is relatively large under a defined-
benefit scheme, a further decline in the population growth rate reduces the steady-
state capital per operating firm, because the negative “tax burden eect” on capital
accumulation dominates the positive “anti-dilution eect”. The existence of an
inverted U-shaped relationship between the population growth rate and the steady-
state per capita capital under a defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme has been
recognized in the existing literature (e.g., Artige et al., 2014; Tabata, 2015). This
paper confirms that the analogous prediction holds in the model with labor market
frictions.
4.2 Steady state unemployment rate and the per capita output
of the economy
In this subsection, we examine how population aging caused by a decline in the
population growth rate influences the steady-state unemployment rate and the per
capita output of the economy under a defined-benefit PAYG pension scheme.
From (14) and (23), the equilibrium unemployment rate ut is given by
ut = 1   l(kt): (32)
Because l0(kt) > 0, the unemployment rate is negatively related to the capital per
operating firm kt, because capital accumulation enhances employment rate by ren-
dering the labor market tighter. Therefore, from (32) and Proposition 3, we can
easily confirm that when a PAYG pension system is financed by a defined-benefit
scheme (i.e., b 2 (0; 1)), there is an U-shaped relationship between the popula-
tion growth rate and the steady-state unemployment rate. However, when there
is no PAYG pension system (i.e., b = 0), the relationship between the population
growth rate and the steady-state unemployment rate is always positive. Numerical
simulation results in Figure 3-2 confirm that these predictions hold under plausible
benchmark parameter values.
Because the capital per operating firm is the dominant factor to determine
the economy’s unemployment rate from (32), the mechanism of the U-shaped
relationship between the population growth rate and the steady-state unemploy-
ment rate is the same as that of the inverted U-shaped relationship between the
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population growth rate and the steady-state capital per operating firm. Thus,
when a PAYG pension system is financed by a defined-benefit scheme (i.e., b 2
(0; 1)), there is a U-shaped relationship between the population growth rate and the
steady-state unemployment rate due to the two competing influences of a decline
in n on capital accumulation (i.e., the “tax burden eect” vs. the “anti-dilution
eect”). However, when there is no PAYG pension system (i.e., b = 0), the only
positive “anti-dilution eect” on capital accumulation prevails, and thus, a decline
in the population growth rate always leads to the lower steady-state unemployment
rate.
We then consider the long run eects of population aging on the per capita
output of the economy. The per capita output y˜t in this economy is given by
y˜t  YtNt+Nt 1 = YtLt LtNt NtNt+Nt 1 . Thus, using (1), (23) and Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1 , y˜t is
rewritten as follows:
y˜t =
Yt
Lt
Lt
Nt
Nt
Nt + Nt 1
= Akt l(kt)
1 + n
2 + n
; (33)
where Akt expresses the output per employed worker, l(kt) expresses the employ-
ment rate and 1+n2+n expresses the share of young working-age population in the total
population.
From (33), the lower population growth rate leads to the smaller share of
young working-age population in the total population (i.e., 1+n2+n ), which negatively
aects the per capita output of the economy y˜t. We denote this direct negative
eect of a decline in n on the per capita output y˜t as the “old-age dependency ra-
tio eect”. On the one hand, because the both output per employed worker Akt
and employment rate l(kt) are positively related to the capital per operating firm
kt, a decline in the population growth rate influences the per capita output y˜t indi-
rectly through its eect on the capital per operating firm (i.e., kt). We denote these
indirect eects of a decline in n on the per capita output y˜t through kt as the “cap-
ital accumulation eect”. From Proposition 3, we can easily confirm that when
a PAYG pension system is financed by a defined-benefit scheme (i.e., b 2 (0; 1)),
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the population growth rate and
the steady-state output per employed worker A(k) or the steady-state employ-
ment rate l(k). However, when there is no PAYG pension system (i.e., b = 0), the
relationship between the population growth rate and the steady-state output per
employed worker A(k) or the steady-state employment rate l(k) is always nega-
tive. From (33), these results suggest that when the indirect “capital accumulation
eects” are large enough to dominate the direct negative “old-age dependency
ratio eect”, we may find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the popula-
tion growth rate and the steady-state per capita output y˜ in the case where a PAYG
pension system is financed by a defined-benefit scheme (i.e., b 2 (0; 1)). However,
in the case where there is no PAYG pension system (i.e., b = 0), the relationship
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between the population growth rate and the steady-state per capita output might
be negative.
Unfortunately, it is dicult to organize these direct and indirect eects of a
decline in n on the steady-state per capita output y˜ analytically. Therefore, we
provide only numerical examples. Figure 3-3 shows numerical examples of the
relationship between the population growth rate and the steady-state per capita
output under alternative values b of pension payout. The figure shows that when
b 2 (0; 1), there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the population
growth rate and the steady-state per capita output. However, when b = 0, the rela-
tionship between the population growth rate and the steady-state per capita output
is always negative. The numerical simulation results under benchmark parameter
values suggest that the indirect “capital accumulation eects” play a significant
role to explain the relationship between the population growth rate and the steady
state per capita output. As inferred from (33), the mechanism of the inverted U-
shaped relationship between the population growth rate and the steady-state per
capita output is the same as that of the inverted U-shaped relationship between the
population growth rate and the steady-state capital per operating firm.
These results obtained in this section suggest that in economies in which
the population growth rate is already low and the size of PAYG pension under
a defined-benefit scheme is relatively large, a further decline in the population
growth rate increases the steady-state unemployment rate and reduces the steady-
state per capita output of the economy because the negative “tax burden eect” on
capital accumulation dominates the positive “anti-dilution eect”.
5 Short run eects of population aging
In this section, we focus on the transitional phase and examine numerically the
short-term eects of population aging on the unemployment rate, the per capita
output of the economy and the welfare level of the current and future generations,
when a PAYG pension system is financed by a defined-benefit scheme.
From (8) and (13), the welfare measure of agents in generation t is given by
the weighted average of the lifetime utility level of the employed Uet and the un-
employed Uut in generation t:
Ut = ltUet + (1   lt)Uut :
We consider the following experiment. Initially, we assume that the economy
is in the steady-state equilibrium where the population growth rate is already low
and is given by nt = 0 (i.e., nt = 0 for all period t < 15). Then, the population
growth rate in period 15 and subsequent periods are decreased from 0 to  0:3
(i.e., nt =  0:3 for all period t  15). These experiments imply that total fertility
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rate of generation 15 and subsequent generations are decreased from 2 per couple
(i.e., nt = 0) to 1.4 per couple (i.e., nt =  0:3). Other parameter values are held
constant at their baseline values in footnote 6. Because the population growth rate
is time-variant, the dynamical system of (28) is rewritten as
l(kt+1)kt+1 =  (nt; (nt 1); (nt))l(kt)kt ;
where
 (nt; (nt 1); (nt))  (1   )[1   (nt 1)]
(1   )A
(1 + nt)[1 + (nt)
 1  ]
;
(nt 1)  b1+nt 1 and (nt)  b1+nt . Moreover, to avoid lexicographic unintuitive
explanations, we focus our analysis on the case where the pension payout is rel-
atively large and is given by b = 0:4. In this case, as shown in the b = 0:4 lines
in Figures 3-1 to 3-3, a decline in the population growth rate from 0 to  0:3 neg-
atively aects both the steady-state capital per operating firm and the per capita
output of the economy, and positively aects the steady-state unemployment rate.
7
Figures 4-1 to 4-3 show the dynamic transition path of the capital per oper-
ating firm, the unemployment rate and the per capita output, respectively. The
decline in population growth rate in period 15 mitigates the dilution of aggregate
savings by generation 15 and thus positively aects the accumulation of capital
per operating firm from period 15 to period 16. In addition, because the old-age
dependency ratio in period 15 remains unchanged, the social security tax burden
of generation 15 also remains unchanged. These factors induce a substantial rise
in the capital per operating firm in period 16. Note that the negative “tax burden
eect” on capital accumulation does not work in period 15, and thus, the only
positive “dilution eect” prevails in period 15. From (32) and (33), because the
capital per operating firm is negatively related to the unemployment rate and is
positively related to the per capita output, as shown in Figures 4-2 and 4-3, the
unemployment rate in period 16 decreases and the per capita output in period 16
increases, respectively.8 However, because the decline in population growth rate
from period 15 increases the social security tax burden of generation 16 and sub-
sequent generations, the capital per operating firm in period 17 and subsequent
periods decreases gradually. Along with these gradual declines in the capital per
operating firm from period 17, the unemployment rate increases, the per capita
output decreases, and the economy gradually converges to the new steady-state
equilibrium. Therefore, consistent with the result of b = 0:4 line in Figure 3-2,
7The case where pension out is relatively small (i.e., b = 0:2) is analyzed in the Appendix.
8Although the direct negative “old-age dependency ratio eect” on the per capita output starts
to work from period 16, the indirect “capital accumulation eects” dominate the “old-age depen-
dency ratio eect” in period 16, which induces a rise in the per capita output in period 16.
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the unemployment rate in the new steady-state equilibrium becomes higher than
that in the original steady-state equilibrium.
Figure 4-4 shows the welfare level of agents belonging to generations 12 to
22. From the figure, the decline in population growth rate from period 15 neg-
atively aects the welfare level of generation 15 and all subsequent generations.
The net welfare losses of future generations tend to be larger than those of the
current generation. Because the rise in capital per operating firm in period 16
has a negative eect on the rate of return of saving that agents of generation 15
receive in their old age, it lowers the welfare level of generation 15. Although
the rise in capital per operating firm in period 16 has a positive welfare eect on
the agents in generation 16 through the hike in their wage income, the decline
in population growth rate from period 15 increases the social security tax burden
of generation 16, which negatively aects the welfare level of agents in genera-
tion 16. Because the latter negative welfare eect dominates the former positive
welfare eect, the welfare level of generation 16 also becomes lower than that in
the original steady-state equilibrium. Moreover, because the level of capital per
operating firm decreases in period 17 and in all subsequent periods, it lowers the
welfare level of all subsequent generations, and the economy gradually converges
to the new steady-state equilibrium. The welfare level in the new steady-state
equilibrium becomes lower than that in the original steady-state equilibrium.
These numerical simulation results suggest that even in economies in which
the population growth rate is already low and the size of PAYG pension is rel-
atively large under a defined-benefit scheme, a further decline in the population
growth rate reduces the unemployment rate and increases the per capita output of
the economy in the short run because the only positive “anti-dilution eect” on
capital accumulation prevails in the short run (i.e., period 16). However, because
the negative “tax burden eect” on capital accumulation dominates the positive
“anti-dilution eect” in the long run, a further decline in the population growth
rate increases the unemployment rate and reduces the per capita output of the
economy in the long run. Moreover, our baseline simulation result shows that
in economies in which the population growth rate is already low and the size of
PAYG pension is relatively large under a defined-benefit scheme, a further decline
in the population growth rate lowers the welfare level of both current and future
generations. The decline in interest rate in period 16 due to the positive “anti-
dilution eect” on capital accumulation lowers the welfare level of generation 15
(i.e., initial old), while the rise in social security tax burden lowers the welfare
level of generation 16 and all subsequent generations. Because the “tax burden
eect” on capital accumulation negatively aects the entire capital accumulation
process, the net welfare losses of future generations tends to be larger than those
of the current generations.
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6 Alternative design of pension payout schemes
In this section, we examine how the alternative design of pension payout schemes
aects the main results of this paper. In the previous sections, the negative “tax
burden eect” on capital accumulation plays a key role to derive our main theoret-
ical result: the U-shaped relationship between the population growth rate and the
steady-state unemployment rate. However, the significance of this negative “tax
burden eect” on capital accumulation heavily depends upon the design of PAYG
pension payout scheme. Suppose that the pension benefit for each old individual
is fully adjusted in response to changes in demographic conditions or young gen-
eration’s social security burden; the rise in pension tax rate due to a decline in n
becomes smaller, which weakens the negative “tax burden eect” on capital accu-
mulation. To confirm this issue, this section examines the two dierent types of
PAYG pension payout scheme: a defined-contribution scheme and a tax adjusted
defined-benefit scheme.
6.1 Defined-contribution scheme
Under a defined-contribution scheme, the pension tax rate t is given by t =  for
all t > 0. In this case, the per capita pension benefit b¯t is determined to meet the
government’s budget constraint of (11) and satisfies the following relationship:
b¯t = (1 + n)wtlt: (34)
Compared with (12) (i.e., pension payment rule under a defined-benefit scheme),
the pension benefit for each old individual is fully adjusted in response to changes
in demographic conditions. The lower population growth rate leads to the lower
pension benefit. Under this type of pension payment rule, the dynamical system
of equation (28) is rewritten as
l(kt+1)kt+1 =  (n; )l(kt)kt : (35)
where
 (n; )  (1   )(1   )
(1   )A
(1 + n)[1 + 
1 

]
:
Note that  is constant irrespective of the value of n. From (35), we can easily con-
firm that the negative “tax burden eect” on capital accumulation disappears and
the only positive “anti-dilution eect” on capital accumulation prevails. There-
fore, under a defined-contribution scheme, a decline in the population growth rate
reduces the unemployment rate and increases the per capita output of the economy
not only in the short run but also in the long run.
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6.2 Tax adjusted defined-benefit scheme
Under a tax adjusted defined-benefit scheme, the pension benefits are paid to all
old individuals according to the following defined-benefit rule:
b¯t = b(1   t)wtlt: (36)
In this case, the pension payment to each old individual in period t is proportional
to but less than the average after tax labor income of the young generation in
period t.9 Compared with (12) (i.e., pension payment rule under a defined-benefit
scheme), the pension benefit for each old individual is fully adjusted in response to
changes in the young generations’ social security tax burden. The higher pension
tax rate leads to the lower per capita pension benefit. Under this type of pension
payment rule, from (11) and (36), the pension tax rate is given by t = ˜(n) =
b
1+n+b . The lower population growth rate leads to the higher pension tax rate.
However, compared with the case of t = (n) = b1+n , the marginal increase in
pension tax rate due to a decline in n becomes smaller. Under this type of pension
payment rule, the dynamical system of equation (28) is rewritten as
l(kt+1)kt+1 =  (n; ˜(n))l(kt)kt : (37)
where
 (n; ˜(n))  (1   )[1   ˜(n)]
(1   )A
(1 + n)[1 + ˜(n)
1 

]
=
(1   )
(1   )A
1 + n + b + b
1 

:
From (37), we can easily confirm that the positive “anti-dilution eect” on capital
accumulation dominates the negative “tax burden eect” in the long run. There-
fore, under a tax adjusted defined-benefit scheme, a decline in the population
growth rate reduces the unemployment rate and increases the per capita output
of the economy not only in the short run but also in the long run.
7 Discussion
Before concluding this paper, we briefly discuss the theoretical results obtained in
Sections 4 to 6. On the one hand, Sections 4 and 5 examine the one extreme case
in which pension benefit is not entirely adjusted in response to changes in demo-
graphic conditions or young generations’ social security burden (i.e., a defined-
benefit scheme). In this case, we show that in economies in which the population
growth rate is already low and the size of PAYG pension is relatively large, a
9The average after tax labor income of the young generation in period t is given by
(1 t t)wtLt+¯t(Nt Lt)
Nt
=
(1 t)wtLt
Nt
= (1   t)wtlt.
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further decline in the population growth rate reduces the unemployment rate and
increases the per capita output of the economy in the short run, but it increases the
unemployment rate and reduces the per capita output of the economy in the long
run. On the other hand, Section 6 examines the opposite extreme case in which the
pension benefit is fully adjusted in response to changes in demographic conditions
(i.e., a defined-contribution scheme) or young generations’ social security burden
(i.e., a tax adjusted defined-benefit scheme). In this case, we show that a decline
in the population growth rate reduces the unemployment rate and increases the per
capita output of the economy not only in the short run but also in the long run.
In general, because the actual PAYG pension payment rule has complex struc-
tures with many policy purposes, it is dicult to judge precisely whether PAYG
pension benefit is fully adjusted in response to changes in demographic condi-
tions or young generations’ social security burden. Moreover, intergenerational
conflicts of interests between young and old generations influence the political
decision regarding the PAYG pension payment rule. For example, the 2004 pen-
sion reform in Japan abandoned the traditional practice of continuously increas-
ing contributions to maintain the ratio of pensions to average wages of working
generations at a constant value (i.e., 59% benefit level). Instead, Japan capped
future contributions at 18.3% and introduced a demographically modified index-
ation program to ensure that the size of pension benefits was consistent with the
new contribution cap, which is a so-called “macroeconomic formula”. However,
this pension cut mechanism was designed to activate only when price and wages
were rising steadily. Consequently, the ratio of pensions to average wages of
workers eventually increased from 59% in 2007 to 62.7% in 2016. Oguro (2014)
notes that the strong opposition of older generations motivates politicians to in-
troduce such a restrictive precondition for pension cut reform, which waters down
the 2004 pension reform plan.
To the best of our knowledge, the actual pension payment rule may lie be-
tween the two extreme cases analyzed in this paper. The current framework omits
many important pension payout design details to obtain intuitive and manageable
results. We also employed rather restrictive preference and production specifi-
cations. The application of our simple framework to assess the likely impact of
policy reform is obviously limited. Therefore, the development of a more elabo-
rate numerical version of the growth model that fully accounts for many important
pension payout design details are promising directions for future research.
8 Concluding remarks
Employing a two period overlapping generations model with labor market fric-
tions and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension, this paper examined how population
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aging caused by a decline in the population growth rate influences the unemploy-
ment rate and the per capita output of the economy under a defined-benefit PAYG
pension scheme. We showed that in economies in which the population growth
rate is already low and the size of PAYG pension is relatively large, a further de-
cline in the population growth rate reduces the unemployment rate and increases
the per capita output of the economy in the short run, but it increases the unem-
ployment rate and reduces the per capita output of the economy in the long run.
We also noted that the design of the pension payout scheme matters to mitigate
the long run negative eects of population aging on the employment rate and the
per capita output of the economy.
Appendix
The proof of Proposition 3-1
Noting the fact that sign[@k
(n)
@n ] = sign[
@ (n;(n))
@n ] from (29), by dierentiating
 (n; (n)) with respect to n, we find:
@ (n; (n))
@n
=
(1   )
(1   )A
(1 + n + b
1 

)2(1 + n)2
G(1 + n);
where
G(1 + n) =  (1 + n)2 + 2b(1 + n) + b2
1   

:
Note that G(1 + n) is quadratic function with respect to 1 + n and satisfies the
following properties.
sign[
@k(n)
@n
] = sign[G(1 + n)];
lim
1+n!b
G(1 + n) > 0;
lim
1+n!1
G(1 + n) =  1;
b = arg max
1+n
G(1 + n):
Therefore, given b 2 (0; 1), there exists a unique nˆ 2 ( (1   b);1) such that
G(1 + nˆ) = 0, G(1 + n) > 0 8n 2 ( (1   b); nˆ), G(1 + n) < 0 8n 2 (nˆ;1), where
nˆ   (1   b) + b
r
1 + 

1   

:
Recalling the fact that sign[@k
(n)
@n ] = sign[G(1+n)], there exists a unique nˆ 2 ( (1 
b);1) such that k(nˆ)  k(n), 8n 2 ( (1   b);1), @k(n)
@n > 0 8n 2 ( (1   b); nˆ),
@k(n)
@n < 0 8n 2 (nˆ;1).
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The proof of Proposition 3-2
Suppose b = 0,  (n; (n)) in (28) is rewritten as
 (n; (n)) =
(1   )
(1   )A
1 + n
:
Recalling the fact that sign[@k
(n)
@n ] = sign[
@ (n;(n))
@n ] from (29), we can easily con-
firm that the relation @k
(n)
@n < 0 holds.
The parameters for the simulation
Following Den Haan et al.(2000), we set the value of , the capital share of out-
put, to 0.36, and the value of , the workers’ Nash bargaining power, to 0.5. To
investigate the eect of the decline in population growth rate, we set the value of
n, population growth rate, to 0 in the base-case simulation, as is observed in Japan,
and changed it from -0.6 to 0.6 in increments of 0.1. In addition, to investigate the
eect of the pension policy, we set the value of b at 0.4 in the base case simulation
and changed it from 0 to 0.6 in increments of 0.2. According to the OECD (2015),
the net pension replacement rate in Japan was 40% for both men and women.
Additionally, the 45%-80% of the average wage for the last six months is paid
to the unemployed people in Japan for the unemployed benefit. Accordingly, we
set the value of  to 0.6. The utility weight given to the consumption in youth 
is set to 0.5 so that the worker’s output share 
 achieves the equilibrium values of
0:714, which is analogous to the results obtained in Hashimoto Im and Kunieda
(2016). We also set the search cost h as a relatively low value, h = 1, such that
the economy is feasible and production occurs in the analysis. Regarding the
remaining parameter values of A and , the productivity of technology and the
parameters for search cost function, we set A = 1 and  = 4 such that the steady-
state unemployment rates are approximately 4 % under the benchmark parameter
values.
Short run eects of population aging in the case where b = 0:2
In this Appendix, we briefly consider the robustness of our numerical simulation
results obtained in Section 5. For comparison, we focus on the case where the
pension payout is relatively small and is given by b = 0:2. In this case, as shown
in the b = 0:2 lines in Figures 3-1 to 3-3, a decline in the population growth rate
from 0 to  0:3 positively aects both the steady-state capital per operating firm
and the per capita output of the economy, and negatively aects the steady-state
unemployment rate.
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Figures 5-1 to 5-3 show the dynamic transition path of the capital per oper-
ating firm, the unemployment rate and the per capita output, respectively. The
decline in the population growth rate in period 15 mitigates the dilution of ag-
gregate savings by generation 15 and thus positively aects the accumulation of
capital per operating firm from period 15 to period 16. In addition, because the
old-age dependency ratio in period 15 remains unchanged, the social security tax
burden of generation 15 also remains unchanged. These factors induce a substan-
tial rise in the capital per operating firm in period 16. Note that the negative “tax
burden eect” on capital accumulation does not work in period 15, and thus, the
only positive “anti-dilution eect” prevails in period 15. From (32) and (33), be-
cause the capital per operating firm is negatively related to the unemployment rate
and is positively related to the per capita output, as shown in Figures 5-2 and 5-3,
the unemployment rate in period 16 decreases, and the per capita output in period
16 increases, respectively.10
Similar to the analyses of Section 5, the “tax burden eect” on capital accu-
mulation starts to work from period 16, and thus, the social security tax burden
of generation 16 and subsequent generations increases. These factors potentially
negatively aect the capital per operating firm in period 17 and subsequent peri-
ods. However, because the positive “anti-dilution eect” on capital accumulation
dominates the negative “tax burden eect”, as shown in Figure 5-1, the capital
per operating firm in period 17 and subsequent periods increases steadily. Along
with these gradual increases in the capital per operating firm from period 17, the
unemployment rate decreases, the per capita output increases, and the economy
gradually converges to the new steady-state equilibrium. Therefore, consistent
with the result of the b = 0:2 line in Figure 3-2, the unemployment rate in the
new steady-state equilibrium becomes lower than that in the original steady-state
equilibrium.
Figure 5-4 shows the welfare level of agents belonging to generations 12 to
22. From the figure, the decline in the population growth rate from period 15 neg-
atively aects the welfare level of generation 15 and all subsequent generations.
The net welfare losses of the current generations tend to be larger than those of
the future generations. Because the rise in capital per operating firm in period 16
has a negative eect on the rate of return of saving that agents of generation 15
receive in their old age, it lowers the welfare level of generation 15. Although
the rise in capital per operating firm in period 16 has a positive welfare eect on
the agents in generation 16 through the hike in their wage income, the decline in
population growth rate from period 15 increases the social security tax burden of
10Although the direct negative “old-age dependency ratio eect” on the per capita output starts
to work from period 16, the indirect “capital accumulation eects” dominate the “old-age depen-
dency ratio eect” in period 16 and in subsequent periods, which induces a rise in the per capita
output in period 16 and in subsequent periods.
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generation 16, which negatively aects the welfare level of agents in generation
16. Because the latter negative welfare eect dominates the former positive wel-
fare eect, the welfare level of generation 16 also becomes lower than that in the
original steady-state equilibrium. However, because the level of capital per oper-
ating firm increases in period 17 and in all subsequent periods, the welfare level
of all subsequent generations increases, and the economy gradually converges to
the new steady-state equilibrium. The welfare level in the new steady-state equi-
librium is lower than that in the original steady-state equilibrium.
These numerical simulation results suggest that in economies in which the size
of PAYG pension is relatively small under a defined-benefit scheme, a decline in
the population growth rate reduces the unemployment rate and increases the per
capita output of the economy not only in the short run, but also in the long run, be-
cause the positive “anti-dilution eect” on capital accumulation always dominates
the negative “tax burden eect”. Moreover, our base line simulation shows that in
economies in which the size of PAYG pension is relatively small under a defined-
benefit scheme, a decline in the population growth rate lowers the welfare level
of both current and future generations. The decline in the interest rate in period
16 due to the positive “anti-dilution eect” on capital accumulation lowers the
welfare level of generation 15 (i.e., initial old), while the rise in social security tax
burden lowers the welfare level of generation 16 and all subsequent generations.
However, because the positive “anti-dilution eect” on capital accumulation dom-
inates the negative “tax burden eect”, the net welfare losses of future generations
tends to be smaller than those of the current generations.
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Figure 1: Beveridge curve and job-creation condition
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Figure 2: The possible dynamic behavior of the economy
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Figure 3: The long run eect of population aging
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Figure 4: The short run eect of population aging (b = 0:4)
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Figure 5: The short run eect of population aging (b = 0:2)
33
